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Using monthly return data on 455 hedge funds over the period 1994-2001 we study the 
diversification effects from introducing hedge funds into a traditional portfolio of stocks 
and bonds. Our results indicate that although the inclusion of hedge funds may significantly 
improve a portfolio’s mean-variance characteristics, it can also be expected to lead to 
significantly lower skewness as well as higher kurtosis. This means that the case for hedge 
funds includes a definite trade-off between profit and loss potential and suggests that, 
contrary to popular belief, hedge funds might be more suitable for institutional than for 
private investors. Our results also emphasize the fact that to have at least some impact on 
the overall portfolio, one has to make an allocation to hedge funds which exceeds the 
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Using monthly return data on 455 hedge funds over the period June 1994 – May 2001, 
in Amin and Kat (2002) we investigated the performance of randomly selected baskets 
of hedge funds ranging in size from 1 to 20 funds. The analysis showed that increasing 
the number of funds can be expected to lead not only to a lower standard deviation but 
also, and less attractive, to lower skewness and increased correlation with the stock 
market. Mean, kurtosis and correlation with bonds tended to be largely unaffected by 
the number of funds. In the same paper we also saw that individual hedge funds show 
extremely high variation in performance. When combined into portfolios the degree of 
variation drops strongly, although at a decreasing rate. For portfolios containing more 
than 15 funds the further decline in variation is only small.  
 
Most investors tend to hold hedge funds as part of a balanced portfolio containing 
stocks, bonds and possibly real estate and private equity as well. In this paper we 
therefore extend the analysis of Amin and Kat (2002) to investigate the diversification 
effects that occur when combining hedge funds with stocks and bonds. We not only 
look at the means and standard deviations of the resulting portfolios’ return 
distributions, but also at their skewness and kurtosis. Our results indicate that although 
including hedge funds in a traditional investment portfolio may significantly improve its 
mean-variance characteristics, it can also be expected to lead to significantly lower 
skewness as well as somewhat higher kurtosis. The case for hedge funds is therefore 
less straightforward than often suggested and requires investors to make a trade-off 
between profit and loss potential. As a result, hedge funds might be more suitable for 
institutional investors than for their current clientele, which consists largely of private 
investors. Our results also emphasize the fact that as long as investors do not invest a 
substantial portion of their wealth in hedge funds, hedge funds will have little or no 
impact on the overall portfolio characteristics. This is an important observation given 
that many institutional investors are currently considering allocating no more than 1–3% 
to hedge funds.
1  
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II. THE DATA 
The data in this study were obtained from Tremont TASS, which is one of the largest 
hedge fund databases currently available. The database at our disposal contains 
monthly net of fee returns on a total of 2183 hedge funds and funds of funds from 
June 1994 up to and including May 2001. We had to eliminate 171 funds due to 
incomplete and ambiguous data. We also eliminated the funds of funds from the 
sample. Per May 2001 this left us with 1195 live and 526 dead funds. As shown in 
Amin and Kat (2001b), concentrating on live funds only will on average overestimate 
the mean return on individual funds by around 2% as well as introduce a significant 
downward bias in estimates of the standard deviation, an upward bias in the skewness 
and a downward bias in the kurtosis estimates of individual fund returns. To 
incorporate this in our analysis we decided not to work with the raw return series of 
the 264 funds that survived the period 1994-2001. Instead, we created 455 7-year 
monthly return series by, starting off with the 455 funds that were alive in June 1994 
and replacing every fund that closed down during the sample period by a fund 
randomly selected from the set of funds following the same type of strategy and alive 
at the time of closure. For simplicity, we will still refer to the data series thus 
obtained as ‘fund returns’.  
 
Implicitly we assume that in case of fund closure investors are able to roll from one 
fund into the other at the reported end-of-month net asset values and at zero additional 
costs. This may underestimate the true costs of fund closure to the investor for two 
reasons. First, when a fund closes shop its investors will have to look for a 
replacement. This search takes time and is not without costs. Second, investors may 
get out of the old and into the new fund at values that are less favourable than the end-
of-month net asset values contained in the database. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
incorporate this into the analysis without further detailed information.    
 
To represent stocks we use the S&P 500 index, while bonds are represented by the 
Salomon Brothers Government Bond index. Over the sample period monthly S&P 
returns have a mean of 1.46%, a standard deviation of 4.39%, a skewness of –0.80 and a ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-06 
 
Copyright 2002, G. Amin and H..M.. Kat 
 
3
kurtosis of 3.92. Monthly bond index returns have a mean of 0.43%, a standard 
deviation of 1.77%, a skewness of 0.56 and a kurtosis of 4.29.   
 
III. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
From the above 455 funds we created 500 different portfolios of 5 hedge funds and 500 
portfolios containing 20 hedge funds by random sampling without replacement. 
Subsequently, we combined every one of these hedge fund portfolios with stocks and 
bonds in proportions ranging from 0% invested in hedge funds to 100% invested in 
hedge funds. Doing so, it is assumed that an equal proportion of wealth is invested in 
stocks and bonds. This gives rise to portfolios like 40% stocks, 40% bonds and 20% 
hedge funds, 30% stocks, 30% bonds and 40% hedge funds, etc.  From the monthly 
returns on the resulting portfolios we calculate four different sample statistics: the mean, 
standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. For hedge fund allocations ranging from 
0% to 100%, the 5
th, 10
th, etc. percentiles of the frequency distributions of these four 
statistics are shown in figure 1-8. 
 
Many will argue that investors (including fund of funds managers) do not select 
portfolios by random sampling. This is certainly true. However, although many 
investors spend a lot of time and effort selecting hedge funds, this does not necessarily 
mean that in many cases a randomly sampled portfolio is not a good proxy for the 
portfolio ultimately selected.
2 So far, there is no evidence that some investors are 
consistently able to select future out-performers
3 nor of the existence of specific patterns 
or anomalies. When corrected for possible biases, there is no significant persistence in 
hedge fund performance nor is there any significant difference in performance between 
older and younger funds, large and small funds, etc. In addition, older funds may be 
(more or less) closed for new investments. Investors that are relatively new to hedge 
fund investing are therefore often forced to invest in funds with little or no track record. 
If so, selecting funds based on (the statistical properties of) their track record is not an 
option. The fund prospectus and interviews with managers may provide some 
information, but in most cases this information will only be sketchy at best and may add 
more confusion than actual value.        ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-06 
 




<< Insert Figure 1-2 >> 
 
Figure 1 and 2 show the frequency distributions of the mean portfolio return for 
varying hedge fund allocations. Figure 1 shows the results for the case where the 
investor invests in a portfolio of 5 hedge funds. Figure 2 does the same assuming the 
investor invests in a portfolio of 20 hedge funds. With 0% hedge funds, a portfolio of 
50% stocks and 50% bonds has a mean return of 0.95%. Since the mean return of a 
portfolio is simply the weighted average of the means of its components, the 
introduction of hedge funds makes the median mean return change linearly from 
0.95% when no hedge funds are included to 0.99% (the mean return on the median 
basket of hedge funds) when 100% is invested in hedge funds. Except for the reduced 
variation around the median in the case of 20 funds, there is no difference between 
both cases.  
 
<< Insert Figure 3-4 >> 
 
Figure 3 and 4 show the frequency distributions of the standard deviation of the 
portfolio return. Here a more interesting picture emerges. Starting at 2.49% for the 
case of no hedge funds, in both cases the median standard deviation drops first and 
rises later. The reasons behind this phenomenon are not the same though. The median 
portfolio of 5 hedge funds has a relatively high standard deviation of 3.03% but this is 
compensated by a relatively low correlation with the S&P 500 of 0.49. The median 
portfolio of 20 hedge funds has a lower standard deviation of 2.44% but at the same 
time a much higher correlation with the S&P 500 of 0.62. As a result, in the case of 5 
funds the minimum standard deviation is slightly higher (2.26%) and reached at a 
lower allocation to hedge funds than in the case of 20 funds (2.15%). As before, there 
is a substantial difference in variation around the median between both cases, 
reflecting the extra uncertainty that comes with investing in only 5 hedge funds 
instead of 20. Figure 3 and 4 make it very clear that to obtain at least some 
diversification benefits investors will have to allocate a very substantial part of their 
wealth to hedge funds. The minimum median standard deviation is reached at a hedge 
fund allocation of 35% in the case of 5 funds and at 50% in the case of 20 funds.     ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-06 
 




<< Insert Figure 5-6 >> 
       
The frequency distributions of the skewness of the portfolio return are shown in figure 5 
and 6. The behaviour of the median shows a remarkable similarity with that of the 
median standard deviation. Starting at –0.32, the median skewness drops first and rises 
later. Again, however, we see significant differences between both cases. In the case of 
5 hedge funds the median reaches a minimum of -0.67 at a hedge fund allocation of 
40%. In the case of 20 funds on the other hand the median reaches a minimum of –0.86 
at an allocation of 55%. One reason for this is the difference in skewness between the 
median portfolio of 5 hedge funds (-0.19) and the median portfolio of 20 funds (-0.48). 
Another explanation lies in the co-skewness properties of hedge funds with stocks and 
bonds. Research is currently underway to investigate this matter in more detail.  
 
<< Insert Figure 7-8 >> 
 
Finally, figure 7 and 8 show the frequency distributions of the kurtosis of the portfolio 
return.  Starting at 2.90, the median kurtosis rises gradually towards the kurtosis level of 
the median portfolio of 5 (4.88) or 20 (5.39) hedge funds. Both graphs are somewhat   
S-shaped though. Most of the rise takes place for hedge fund allocations between 25% 
and 65%. For allocations smaller than 25% the effect from the inclusion of hedge funds 
on the kurtosis of the overall portfolio return can be expected to be relatively limited.  
 
IV. BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER 
The above clearly shows that the reduction of the standard deviation of the portfolio 
return resulting from the inclusion of hedge funds is not a free lunch. The beneficial 
effect of hedge funds on the standard deviation tends to go hand in hand with an 
opposite effect on the return distribution’s skewness and kurtosis. As a result, the overall 
shape of the portfolio return distribution can be expected to change substantially as a 
result of the inclusion of hedge funds. Figure 9 shows the return distribution of a 
portfolio of 50% stocks and 50% bonds as well as the distribution of the median 
portfolio of 30% stocks, 30% bonds and 40% hedge funds. Comparing both ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-06 
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distributions we see that they intersect several times. Reading the graph from left to 
right, the net effect of the inclusion of hedge funds therefore consists of: (1) an increase 
in the probability of a large loss, (2) a lower probability of a smaller loss, (3) a higher 
probability of a low positive return, and (4) a lower probability of a high positive return.  
 
<< Insert Figure 9 >> 
 
Figure 9 clearly shows that investors who include hedge funds in their portfolio trade in 
profit potential for reduced loss potential. This means that the case for hedge funds is 
less straightforward than often suggested. In essence, hedge funds offer investors a 
way to modify the risk-return characteristics of their portfolio.
4 Whether the resulting 
portfolio makes for a more attractive investment than the original is a matter of taste 
though. Institutional investors, for whom stability is a very important issue, might be 
more than happy to accept a higher probability of a more mediocre result if it allowed 
them to significantly reduce their portfolio’s loss potential (although they should not 
ignore the prolonged left tail of the new distribution). Wealthy private investors on 
the other hand might be a lot less charmed by the reduction in profit potential and 
might prefer the original portfolio over the new portfolio. This strongly suggests that 
hedge funds might be better suited for institutional investors than for private 
investors. Surprisingly, however, so far private investors have been the main 
investors in hedge funds. Driven by low interest rates and declining stock markets, 
institutional investors are showing interest but, apart from a number of US 
endowments, not many have made a significant allocation to hedge funds yet.  
 
V. SOME OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Apart from the fact that the only way to capitalize on the low volatility and low 
correlation properties of hedge funds seems to be to allocate quite a significant part of 
one’s wealth to hedge funds and accept the additional negative skewness that tends to 
come with it, there are a number of other important points to consider before making an 
allocation to hedge funds. In this section we briefly discuss three of them, all relating to 
the validity of the inputs used in the portfolio decision-making process.    ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-06 
 





As discussed in Brooks and Kat (2001) for example, the available monthly returns of 
hedge funds involved in convertible arbitrage, risk arbitrage or distressed securities 
tend to exhibit a high degree of positive serial correlation. The explanation for this 
phenomenon lies in the difficulty for these types of hedge funds’ administrators to 
generate up-to-date valuations of their positions. When confronted with this problem, 
administrators either use the last reported transaction price or an estimate of the 
current market price, which may easily create lags in the evolution of these funds’ net 
asset value. As a result of the autocorrelation, estimates of the standard deviation of 
monthly hedge fund returns may be biased downwards by a significant amount. 
Brooks and Kat (2001) show that when corrected for serial correlation the standard 
deviation of the monthly return on the CSFB/Tremont Convertible Arbitrage index for 
example increases from 1.36% to 2.42%. Incorporation of this bias will make certain 
types of hedge funds more risky and their inclusion in the portfolio less attractive. 
Brooks and Kat (2001) provide several examples.  
 
Illiquidity 
Many hedge funds employ long lock-up and advance notice periods. Such restrictions 
are not only meant to reduce managing costs and cash holdings but also allow 
managers to aim for longer-term horizons and invest in relatively illiquid securities, 
including exotic OTC derivatives. As a result of the above, hedge fund investments 
are substantially less liquid than investments in common stocks or bonds. If this 
relative illiquidity is incorporated in the portfolio decision-making process, for 
example by lowering the expected return by an amount equal to the cost of 
securitization of the hedge fund portfolio, this will reduce the benefits of hedge 
funds.  
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Estimation Error  
Since most data vendors only started collecting data on hedge funds around 1994 and 
hedge funds report into these databases only once a month, the available data set on 
hedge funds is very limited. Apart from spanning a very short period of time, the 
available data on hedge funds also span a very special period; the great bull market of 
the 1990s. This sharply contracts with the situation for stocks and bonds. Not only do 
we have return data over differencing intervals much shorter than one month, we also 
have those data available over a period of many years, extending over many business 
cycles. This has allowed us to gain insight into the main factors behind stock and 
bond returns and also allows us to distinguish between normal and abnormal market 
behaviour. The return generating process behind hedge funds on the other hand is 
still much of a mystery
5 and so far we have little idea what constitutes normal 
behaviour and what not. Risk arbitrage funds used to show impressive performance 
during the recent bull market but are currently confronted by a serious lack of merger 
activity that can be expected to greatly impact their performance. Many investors are 
therefore switching to other relative value strategies like convertible arbitrage for 
example.  
 
With institutional interest in hedge funds on the increase another question that arises 
is when the hedge fund industry will reach capacity. Schmidt (2001) notes that while 
the hedge fund industry has experienced strong growth over the last five years more 
hedge funds are showing similar and lower returns. This could be taken as a first 
indication there may not be enough opportunities in the global capital markets to 
allow hedge funds to continue to deliver the sort of returns that we have seen so far. 
However, it could also simply be the result of sampling error or, following the collapse 
of LTCM, the implementation of improved risk management procedures and a 
reduction in the overall degree of leverage employed by hedge funds.   
 
Although this is by no means an easy task, the above uncertainties should be properly 
incorporated in the portfolio decision-making process. Of course, doing so will again 
reduce the attractiveness of hedge funds.  
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-06 
 
Copyright 2002, G. Amin and H..M.. Kat 
 
9
VI. CONCLUSION  
In this paper we have studied the diversification effects from including hedge funds 
into a portfolio of stocks and bonds. The three main conclusions are as follows: 
 
1. Size of allocation. To have at least some impact on the overall portfolio, 
investors will have to make an allocation to hedge funds which far exceeds 
the typical 1-3% that many institutions are currently considering.  
 
2. Effect of introducing hedge funds. When increasing the hedge fund 
allocation both the portfolio standard deviation and the portfolio skewness 
can be expected to drop. Portfolio kurtosis will rise but for hedge fund 
allocations smaller than 25% at a relatively low rate.  
 
3. Who should buy hedge funds? By introducing hedge funds into their 
portfolio investors tend to trade in profit potential for reduced loss potential. 
This suggests that hedge funds may be more appropriate for institutional 
investors than for private investors.  
 
Hedge funds are not necessarily good or bad. They are just very different from what 
most investors are used to and require a more elaborate approach to investment 
decision-making than currently in use by most investors. When studied in the 
traditional framework, the inclusion of hedge funds in a portfolio appears to pay off 
impressive dividends. However, when taking into account the complexity of hedge 
fund returns and their relationship with each other and other asset classes, their 
illiquidity, and the lack of (reliable) data, the matter becomes quite a lot more 
complicated.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-06 
 





1. Recent announcements by major institutions such as CalPERS and ABP that 
they will invest hundreds of millions in hedge funds are often used in the 
marketing of (funds of) hedge funds to smaller institutions. One should keep in 
mind, however, that large institutions like these manage enormous amounts of 
money, often implying an allocation to hedge funds of less than 1%.     
 
2. Note that the same point is often made about investing in common stocks. This 
emphasizes that hedge funds share several important characteristics with 
common stocks.  
 
3. Although funds of hedge funds often claim to possess superior fund selection 
skills, over the period 1994 –2001 the average fund of funds underperformed an 
equally-weighted portfolio of randomly selected hedge funds by around 3% per 
annum. Likewise, Amin and Kat (2001a) found a difference in efficiency 
between the average funds of funds and the average hedge fund index of almost 
5%.     
 
4. The question whether hedge funds are the most efficient way to accomplish this 
modification is dealt with in detail in Amin and Kat (2001a). 
 
5. Apart from lack of data, part of the problem is also that, depending on 
perceived market opportunities or lack thereof, many hedge funds rotate 
between strategies over time. Due to a lack of merger activity, risk arbitrage 
funds are currently turning to other relative value strategies such as 
convertible arbitrage for example.   
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